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INTRODUCTION
1

In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the
Supreme Court addressed whether two third-party participants in a
fraudulent scheme, engineered by a corporate issuer, faced liability in
a private securities lawsuit for harm caused by the issuer’s false and
misleading corporate disclosures. Though the inquiry would seem to
be a matter of determining whether the participants’ deceptive, behind-the-scenes conduct constituted a “primary” violation of the anti2
fraud prohibition found in SEC Rule 10b-5, the Court instead answered by interpreting the reliance element of the plaintiffs’ cause of
action. The Court held that there is no reliance, and hence no liability, when the link between the third party’s actions and the resulting
3
misrepresentation by the issuer is too remote or attenuated.
Conduct, reliance, and proximity, however, are conceptually distinct; by blending them together, Justice Kennedy’s opinion makes
something of a doctrinal mishmash. The dish is tasty enough to those
who dislike strong securities class actions, with abundant probusiness
4
dicta adding ample spice. But the recipe has few serious academic
5
defenders, even among those who like its outcome, and has been the
6
object of disgust for those who do not. The standard account is that
1

552 U.S. 148 (2008). The decision was five to three: Justice Stevens wrote a
lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, and Justice Breyer did not take
part in the decision.
2
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (declaring it unlawful to use “any facility of any national securities exchange” to commit fraud).
3
See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (“Petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance
upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for liability.”).
4
See, e.g., id. at 164 (“Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws
could be deterred from doing business here.”); see also infra note 172.
5
See A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 233-34
(defending Stoneridge as an attempt to limit the private right of action under Rule
10b-5). For a somewhat more sympathetic view, see Richard A. Booth, The Future of
Securities Litigation, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 129, 135 (2009), which suggests that although
the case could have been decided another way, it invited a thorough reconsideration
of the role of causation in Rule 10b-5 litigation.
6
See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay on Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. 448, 450-51
(2009) (describing the decision as one based on policy considerations rather than
sound doctrine); Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme
to Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 309 (2010) (characterizing Stoneridge as “insulating culpable parties from private action liability when they did not directly participate in the sale of securities”); Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a
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the Court was, yet again, showing its reflexive antipathy toward private
securities class actions, throwing whatever was at hand into the pot in
order to achieve a business-friendly result. As we shall see, most lower
courts have read Stoneridge as doing little more than truncating thirdparty liability via an especially strict reliance requirement.
My sense is that both courts and commentators have paid too
much attention to the dicta and too little to the holding. Though I,
too, would have decided the case differently, the substance of the academic criticism and the unimaginative way lower courts have read and
applied the Court’s teachings are too simple. In Stoneridge, as in the
two other most recent Supreme Court decisions addressing securities
7
8
class actions, Tellabs and Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court articulated a
more moderate test than it might have, even though all three held for
the defendants. Pure antipathy toward securities class action plaintiffs
presumably would have led to more extreme holdings, which suggests
that something different is going on.
9
In this Article, I offer a novel reading of Stoneridge. There is a respectable idea at work in the opinion, which we can refine. The Court’s
Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 351, 393 (criticizing the majority for revising hundreds of years of fraud history “without any grounding in the language, legislative history, or policy” underlying section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act); Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge—Escape from Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active, Intentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170, 180 (2008) (describing the Stoneridge decision as “clearly wrong”).
7
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (holding that a complaint will survive dismissal under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) “only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged”). Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Tellabs provoked critical concurrences by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito because of its moderation, but
Justice Kennedy voted with the majority. For a discussion of Tellabs’s implications, see
James D. Cox, Randall Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause
Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 421, 436-38. In particular, the article noted, “Tellabs’s salience within securities
litigation will come from its call for courts to focus on all aspects of the complaint, its
requirement that inferences are to be drawn both for and against the plaintiff, and its
enunciation of a somewhat malleable meaning for strong.” Id. at 437.
8
See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005) (requiring securities complaints charging fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to plead loss
causation by alleging an inflated price caused by the securities violation and a subsequent price decrease caused by the exposure of the truth in the market).
9
My reading bears some similarity to one Ronald Colombo puts forward, though he
ties the proper test for third-party liability to “principles of cooperation” derived from
moral philosophy and theology. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud,
61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 91-92 (2009) (using philosophical principles to determine the moral
blameworthiness of acts undertaken by one who cooperates with wrongdoers).
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choice of reliance as the crucial element indicates the Court’s comfort
with having different liability outcomes in Rule 10b-5 cases depending
on whether the action is an SEC enforcement or criminal prosecution
10
(where reliance is not required) or private litigation (where it is).
Why might such a distinction make sense? One possible answer
comes by considering the extraordinary nature of the liability in private fraud-on-the-market cases, which is based on the aggregate
claims of all those who bought or sold from the time of the alleged
primary misrepresentations to the date of corrective disclosure. This
figure can be staggeringly large, yet disconnected from any meaningful reliance-in-fact requirement. Even if the underlying conduct
was wrongful, making a defendant pay such a large amount can seem
severely disproportionate. By contrast, in SEC enforcement actions,
the monetary penalty varies based on a set of factors specifically tied
11
to the gravity of the wrongdoing. In Part I, I expand on this idea
and make my main argument: that by emphasizing remoteness and
attenuation in the context of private securities litigation, Stoneridge
reinvigorates the idea of duty as a limitation on liability to openmarket investors in order to constrain the unique liability risk that
defendants face.
In Part II, I explore the risk of disproportion and make two
claims. First, fraud-on-the-market liability is an extraordinary remedy
because it creates a potential recovery different from, and in excess of,
normal conceptions of provable reliance damages. Second, a hard
look at the key elements of a Rule 10b-5 action—including scienter—
shows that securities fraud bears enough resemblance to negligence in
terms of indeterminacy and precaution costs that a duty-based analysis
makes sense. Later in Part II, I also consider how Congress has tried
to address the disproportionality problem explicitly. Section 21D(f)
of the Securities Exchange Act, added as part of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), purports to impose a proportionate liability regime, drawn from similar reform efforts in tort law

10

For more on the relationship between public and private securities law enforcement, and a proposal for bringing private litigation even more under the control
of the SEC, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301
(2008). Rose proposes greater oversight by the SEC to reduce focus on the implied
private right and to achieve optimal deterrence. Id. at 1305-06.
11
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2006)
(setting tiers of penalties, with maximum amounts, based on the presence of fraud,
pecuniary gain, and losses suffered by investors).
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12

at the state level. My argument is that this provision fails to do its
job, thereby justifying judicial concern.
Part III puts forth my duty-based reading of what the Stoneridge
Court was struggling to say with its emphasis on attenuation and remoteness. I explain that this kind of duty is different from the affirmative duty to speak, which is fairly narrow and circumscribed, and
instead performs the tort law–like function of identifying a limited
category of relational misconduct for which extraordinary fraud-onthe-market liability is deserved. Thinking of Stoneridge in this way gives
meaning to portions of the opinion that otherwise might seem unintelligible, like the Court’s distinction between defendants who inhabit
the realm of commerce versus the realm of finance, and shows that
there is, in fact, ample room for third-party liability in the right kinds
of cases. Part IV explains that this perspective helps resolve the most
common third-party liability problems, comparing and critiquing the
overly restrictive way in which lower courts have responded to Stoneridge. In Part IV, I take a critical look at the “attribution” test for primary liability, which lower courts seem to assume has survived Stoneridge. Though that reading may be formally correct, I suggest that a
duty-based reading obviates the need for it.
Because I do not expect to resolve the lingering confusion and inconsistency in current doctrine simply by reading Stoneridge differently,
a further legislative fix is necessary. The cases are just too gerrymandered to operate fairly or effectively. So, in Part V, I suggest a revision
of proportionate liability that is fair and workable in light of the analysis herein. With such a regime in place, concerns about excessive liability should diminish considerably, and with that, we can think in
terms of expanding third-party liability beyond what the Court permits,
including the restoration of aiding-and-abetting liability.
I. STONERIDGE: THE SCOPE OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY
AND THE ROLE OF RELIANCE
In Stoneridge, plaintiffs alleged that two large vendors of cable television set-top boxes, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, had entered into
deceptive transactions with a cable-system operator, Charter Communications, and backdated or falsified documents to disguise the

12

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) § 21D(f), 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (imposing a framework of joint, several, and proportionate liability
on persons covered under the Act).
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13

sham. Plaintiffs argued that by participating in Charter’s scheme to
inflate revenues with sham transactions, the vendors assumed responsibility for Charter’s lies about its financial condition. This claim
raised a host of interpretive questions, many of which the parties or the
many amici addressed during briefing and argument. Had the two
third-party defendants engaged in a deceptive device or contrivance of
their own, rather than simply assisting Charter’s? If so, was it in connection with the purchase or sale of a security? Did the plaintiffs adequately plead scienter, reliance, and loss causation? Of all these poten14
tial issues, the Court rested its holding solely on lack of reliance.
In retrospect, this fixation on reliance seems to be a simple and
predictable extension of the Court’s 1994 holding in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, which radically narrowed the
scope of third-party liability by excluding aiding-and-abetting liability
15
as an acceptable claim under Rule 10b-5. The fact that Stoneridge
reads that way is hardly surprising, given that Justice Kennedy wrote
both opinions and worked hard to make them seamless. But any
seeming inevitability is hindsight bias at work: in fact, the two cases
pose distinct issues and could readily support very different outcomes.
In Central Bank, the Court rejected aiding-and-abetting liability for
a number of reasons, textual as well as policy-based, including fear of
16
excessive litigation.
In dicta, the Court suggested, among other
things, that aiding-and-abetting liability would allow defendants to be
held “liable without any showing that the plaintiff relied upon the ai17
der and abettor’s statements or actions.” Later, the Court repeated
that a person who employs a manipulative device can be found primarily liable, “assuming all of the requirements for primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 [including reliance] are met,” but emphasized that
it was leaving open the question of the scope of primary liability (i.e.,

13

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153-54
(2008). The plaintiffs also sued Charter and its accountants, but they settled that portion of the case, thereafter turning entirely to the two third-party defendants for the
remaining damages.
14
See id. at 161 (“[W]e conclude respondents’ deceptive acts . . . are too remote to
satisfy the requirement of reliance.”).
15
511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
16
See, e.g., id. at 189 (noting the particular “vexatiousness” of Rule 10b-5 litigation).
17
Id. at 180. The Court seems to have been heavily influenced by an article by
Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69
CAL. L. REV. 80 (1981). Fischel argued that Supreme Court jurisprudence limits all
liability to what is permissible under the relevant statutory language, rather than under
common law traditions. Id. at 82.
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what kind of conduct exceeds mere aiding and abetting so as to fall
18
within the scope of the prohibition).
As commentators on Central Bank quickly pointed out, this em19
phasis on reliance was puzzling, and in the cases that followed, plaintiffs took the perfectly sensible position that so long as there was some
causal link between the third party’s acts or omissions and the misinformation on which investors relied, the reliance element would be
satisfied. After all, the reliance requirement had long been seen as
20
demanding just a “but for” causal relationship. If this were the case,
the crucial question would simply be when a third party bears responsibility for the public misstatement on which reliance is presumed.
This inquiry goes entirely to the question of primary liability. Lower
courts famously split on this question, with the first case from the Ninth
Circuit taking a relatively liberal approach and holding that responsibility follows whenever the third-party defendant substantially participated
21
in the making of the misstatement. But other courts—notably the
Second Circuit—soon staked out a much stricter position, insisting that
primary liability arises only where there is some sort of public attribution of responsibility to the third-party defendant for the misstate22
ment. This latter view, which seemingly ruled out any liability for be18

Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 887 (1995) (criticizing Central Bank’s
departure from other cases that recognized aiding-and-abetting liability); see also Jill E.
Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary
Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1999) (criticizing the Court’s lack of guidance on what would merit the imposition of primary liability on secondary defendants); Robert A. Prentice, Locating that “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 710-11
(1997) (listing strong criticisms of Central Bank’s reasoning).
20
Some early decisions thus refer to reliance as transaction causation. See Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]o show transaction causation a plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentation[] . . . .”).
21
See In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to hold underwriters liable for misleading statements because they reasonably did not know the statements were untrue).
22
See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]
secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination.”); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717,
720-21 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an accounting firm was not liable for failing to disclose material information when it was not under a duty to do so); see also Ziemba v.
Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he alleged misstatement
or omission . . . must have been publicly attributable to the defendant at the time that
the plaintiff’s investment decision was made.”). The law in the Second Circuit was
muddied by a number of cases that suggested some softening, but not abandonment,
of the attribution rule. See In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 75-76 (2d Cir.
19
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hind-the-scenes actors, no matter how important their roles, was justified in large part by reference to the reliance dicta in Central Bank.
That is, these courts could not see how there could ever be reliance on
an unknown actor’s private words or conduct. But this reference to reliance was simply justification; instead of addressing reliance as a separate element, courts were addressing the larger question of what constitutes deceptive conduct within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.
Because of the growing judicial conservatism on this particular
question as more courts followed the Second Circuit’s lead, plaintiffs
quickly shifted their emphasis away from claims of misrepresentations
for which third-party defendants were responsible under Rule 10b5(b) to broader allegations that the third party’s actions were part of a
“scheme to defraud,” for which they should bear coconspirator-like
23
responsibility under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c).
With this strategy,
plaintiffs had a notable (but temporary) district court victory in the
24
massive Enron litigation, and some favorable language (though not a
favorable result) from the Ninth Circuit in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner

2001) (holding that a vice president could be liable for his company’s misstatements,
even when they were not attributable to him, because he was primarily responsible for
the company’s communications with investors and the drafting of misleading statements); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (requiring
that plaintiffs show what effect the allegedly fraudulent acts had on the market for the
securities in question, without requiring plaintiffs to show specific reliance); In re
Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (permitting
claims against an auditor primarily responsible for false statements to survive a motion
to dismiss after finding that “[a] strict requirement of public attribution would allow
those primarily responsible for making false statements to avoid liability by remaining
anonymous”). In a subsequent case on the subject, the Second Circuit was again fairly
restrictive. In Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), the
court reasoned that “[p]ublic understanding that an accountant is at work behind the
scenes does not create an exception to the requirement that an actionable misstatement
be made by the accountant.” Underscoring its rigid attribution requirement, the court
stated that “[u]nless the public’s understanding is based on the accountant’s articulated
statement, the source for that understanding—whether it be a regulation, an accounting practice, or something else—does not matter.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The
Second Circuit’s return to a strict insistence on attribution was made clear most recently
in Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown, No. 09-1619, 2010 WL 1659230
(2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2010), discussed infra in notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
23
See Prentice, supra note 6, at 353 (discussing plaintiffs’ shift toward the use of
Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) after Central Bank).
24
See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 70607 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (adopting a “scheme”-based approach that allows prosecution for
aiding and abetting as a primary violation of section 10(b)).
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25

Inc. But there were major losses as well. The Fifth Circuit later over26
turned the district court ruling in the Enron litigation, borrowing extensively from the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in In re Charter
27
Communications, Inc.—the Stoneridge case.
I am not inclined to linger over the Court’s choice in Stoneridge to
make reliance the determinative issue in assessing scheme liability,
even though, like the dissenters, I find it strange. The standard fraudon-the-market theory presumes that investors rely on price integrity,
28
not directly on the misinformation itself. The “but for” causal connection between defendants’ acts and the price distortion was cogent
and well pleaded. In essence, plaintiffs were arguing that the thirdparty defendants directly misled Charter’s auditor, which in turn led
the auditor to certify Charter’s false financials and, thus, the resultant
price distortion. Had the auditors not been fooled, plaintiffs said, it is
29
unlikely that Charter’s scheme would have succeeded. This is a classic claim of indirect reliance, well known in both tort and securities
law. By situating its restrictive approach in the element of reliance,
the Court conveniently limited its holding to private securities litigation. This arguably leaves the SEC and criminal prosecutors free to
30
make more aggressive claims against third parties. The fact that this
distinction was strongly urged by the Solicitor General in the govern31
ment’s amicus brief —which the Court followed fairly faithfully in
Stoneridge—is circumstantial evidence of a motivation to strike only at
private securities litigation. If so, then the awkwardness of basing this
25

See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he scope of [section] 10(b) includes deceptive conduct in furtherance of a
‘scheme to defraud.’”).
26
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court’s interpretation of section 10(b) was too broad).
27
See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting broad use of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) and narrowing the definition of “deceptive”),
aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
The case was restyled as Stoneridge when the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
28
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (explaining that the
fraud-on-the-market theory is premised on the idea that market prices adjust to reflect
all available information, and thus fraudulent information distorts prices and affects all
investors) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
29
See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160 (explaining plaintiffs’ arguments).
30
But see infra note 143 and accompanying text (describing a post-Stoneridge case in
which the alleged executive behavior was insufficient to find primary liability).
31
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18,
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148 (No. 06-0043) [hereinafter Brief for the United States] (distinguishing the requirements of private actions from criminal prosecutions).
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distinction on reliance is relatively harmless: private plaintiffs are
probably in no worse position than if the Court had ruled directly on
the issue of what constitutes deceptive conduct, while public enforcers
(and their investor beneficiaries) are arguably better off.
The Court did not explain its statement that the chain between
32
defendants’ acts and plaintiffs’ reliance was “too remote,” except in
making two related points. One, stressed repeatedly, is that ScientificAtlanta and Motorola were dealing with Charter in “the realm of ordinary business operations” (i.e., that of purchase and supply contracts, advertising, etc.), as opposed to the realm of finance, which
touches on the securities markets and hence is of special federal con33
cern. At first glance, this argument seems almost inane. Accounting
and financial reports are nothing more than the quantitative expression of the results of business operations, ordinary and extraordinary.
As the Court later acknowledges, what Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
allegedly did was proscribed by federal law as criminal and civil aiding
and abetting. In fact, managers at both companies were penalized by
the SEC for exactly the same kinds of dealings with Adelphia, another
cable television issuer caught up in an even larger financial reporting
34
scandal. The federal interest here seems especially compelling because the third parties’ deception seemed to be directed at Charter’s
35
auditors, and independent auditors play a central, congressionally
mandated role in the federal regime designed to promote corporate
transparency and stock price integrity. Here, like an overzealous advocate getting carried away with his argument, Justice Kennedy seems

32

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 161; see also id. at 166 (noting that Charter’s relationship with defendants
“took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere”).
34
See In re Motorola, Exchange Act Release No. 55,725, [2007 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,908, at 84,809 (May 8, 2007) (instituting a cease-anddesist order against Motorola for participating in a “round-trip of cash” with Adelphia
and helping Adelphia falsify its earnings); In re Eidson, Exchange Act Release No.
54,031, 88 SEC Docket 782 (June 22, 2006) (establishing a cease-and-desist order
against Scientific-Atlanta’s senior vice president of finance and operations for approving Adelphia’s behavior); In re Haislip, Exchange Act Release No. 54,030, 88 SEC
Docket 779 (June 22, 2006) (imposing a cease-and-desist order against ScientificAtlanta’s principal accounting officer for approving misreporting done by Adelphia).
35
In their complaint, plaintiffs raised the possibility that the auditors were complicit in the fraud; in fact, Arthur Andersen settled early on. One possible interpretation of the facts is that Andersen wanted fabricated documentation simply so it could
feign ignorance of the fraud and thereby escape an obligation to blow the whistle.
Were this so, the case for primary liability would be much weaker. On appeal, however, all parties assumed that the deceptive conduct was intended to mislead Andersen.
33
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too quick to seize on a federalism argument. But I think more sense
can be made of the distinction, and so I will return to it shortly.
The Court’s other justification, also puzzling at first glance, is that
nothing the secondary defendants did “made it necessary or inevitable
36
for Charter to record the transactions as it did.” This could be read
to narrow the scope of third-party liability to almost nothing, because
37
very few contributory acts ever make a fraud necessary or inevitable.
The Solicitor General’s brief, from which this idea derives, was more
nuanced, claiming in essence that the defendants’ sham contracts and
falsified documents merely set the stage for Charter to more easily
dupe its accountants and, consequently, its investors, but that almost
38
all of the active deception was by Charter. In this light, the point is
more consistent with, and not substantially different from, the Court’s
repeated emphasis on remoteness and attenuation.
For our purposes, it is crucial to note how open-ended and indeterminate the Court’s remoteness standard is, which should not make
it particularly restrictive for lower courts. As noted earlier, some courts
had developed much stricter approaches to what constitutes deceptive
conduct prior to Stoneridge—most notably the “bright-line” attribution
39
test —that the Court could easily have endorsed in the context of the
facts before it. Many amicus briefs supporting the defendants,
representing nearly all portions of the business community and drafted
by the elite of the Supreme Court bar, were not shy about offering stringent standards that would all but eliminate third-party liability.
That the Court did not follow these pleas is well worth pondering,
and takes us to the crucial question: should we read Stoneridge’s conclusion about attenuation simply as a reason the reliance claim failed,
or is it the reason? If the latter, what does this imply about the scope
of third-party liability under Rule 10b-5 more generally? The Court’s
tradition of holdings narrowly tailored to the facts before it favors the
former reading. The Solicitor General’s office had strongly urged restraint, telling the Court that it was unnecessary to reach any further
questions, like the propriety of the attribution test, when third-party

36

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161.
One example where this might be an apt characterization would be where a
participant deceives not only the company’s auditors but other senior managers as
well, duping them into repeating the lie in the company’s filings.
38
See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 20-21 (“The critical point is that
it was Charter’s misrepresentation of its cash flow, not respondents’ conduct, on which
petitioner allegedly relied.”).
39
See infra Section IV.A (discussing the pre-Stoneridge attribution test).
37
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40

liability is justified —an equivocation that quite possibly was the result
of the office’s own private negotiations with the SEC, which had long
pushed for a more expansive approach to primary liability in its own
enforcement and amicus briefs.
On the other hand, since there were so many available tests, both
for reliance as well as for other elements underlying scheme liability,
it seems fair to assume that the Court chose deliberately to use remoteness and attenuation as the best way to think about reliance. At
one point, the Court posed the inquiry specifically in terms of whether
41
the third party’s acts “were immediate or remote to the injury,” suggesting that it was putting forth a test. So, without suggesting that it is
the only plausible reading of the Court’s opinion, I want to make the
following assumption and then see what follows from its natural implication: that there may be a significant category of cases where
third-party involvement is not too remote or attenuated from plaintiff’s reliance. If so, thinking about what kinds of third-party involvement might be immediate rather than remote is necessary, which in
turn requires thinking about what differentiating between the two accomplishes. As discussed more fully below, I posit that the Court’s test
is a way of limiting third-party liability to those cases in which the defendant fairly deserves the extraordinary form of liability that fraudon-the-market lawsuits threaten. The more remote from the fraud the
defendant’s conduct is, the less likely it is that this potential liability is
either fair or efficient; the more immediate it becomes, the more likely that primary liability would be the defendant’s just deserts. The
judge can decide this as a matter of law, thereby dismissing defendants
early on when appropriate. The Court offers a sliding-scale test aimed
at creating rough proportionality between the conduct and the extraordinary risk of liability these lawsuits generate.
Later, I shall explore how such a reading of Stoneridge applies to
particular factual circumstances that have arisen in recent cases. But
first, an important definitional point: it is tempting to see the Court’s
actions as substituting proximate cause for but-for causation in the reliance inquiry. However, the standard approach to proximate cause is
famously one of foreseeability. The plaintiffs were probably right to
argue to the Court that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were aware
(or at least that a reasonable person in their position would have been
40

See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 22 n.12 (“[M]isstatements made
by a secondary actor must be publicly attributed to the secondary actor before liability
can attach in a private action.”).
41
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160.
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aware) that Charter was going to use the sham contracts and falsified
documents to produce false accounting results, thereby satisfying a foreseeability standard. The Court responded to this by explicitly rejecting such a standard, stating that “[w]ere this concept of reliance to be
adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does business; and there is no au42
thority for this rule.” This refers back to the world-of-commerce/
world-of-finance distinction.
If proximate cause does not aptly describe the kind of analysis at
work, what does? Two possibilities come closer. One is standing,
which addresses whether the victim’s claimed injury would justify a
43
claim against the defendant in question. A better way of describing
the analysis, however, is in terms of duty. The Court appears to be saying that only certain kinds of actors and conduct ought to be subjected to the extraordinary risk of a fraud-on-the-market lawsuit—i.e.,
that the enforceable duty of candor owed specifically to all investors in
the capital marketplace should be limited and should not attach to
“the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does business”
unless the actors can fairly be said to owe a cognizable duty to the
44
marketplace. Here, the Court’s otherwise incoherent articulation of
a difference between the realms of business and finance makes more
sense: maybe the duty should largely be limited to those who inhabit
the realm of finance and hence are on notice of the extraordinary legal risks and responsibilities that the federal securities laws create.
The sliding scale of attenuation and remoteness might capture this
fairly well. Part III will explain this notion more fully.
However, we first need to examine and clarify more carefully the
supposed need for proportionality. In tort-reform debates, claims of
disproportionate liability and limited duty can easily mask probusiness
protectionism. If the recovery in fraud-on-the-market cases is nothing
more than the sum of all the victims’ real damages, we should be
more worried about making the injured investors whole than protecting the pocketbooks of third-party actors who engaged in deceptive,

42

Id. at 160.
I am grateful to Gerry Spann for suggesting standing as a possibility. Another
possibility is the “in connection with” requirement, see infra Section III.A, but this
would apply to SEC actions as well.
44
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160.
43
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45

illegal misconduct. Proximate cause and duty are workhorses in tort
law, but mostly in the law of negligence. Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of intent and, hence, culpability. The next Part will show why disproportionality is a troublesome problem in private securities litigation that warrants a measured response.
II. THE PROPORTIONALITY PROBLEM
A. Remedial Overbreadth
The standard measure of damages in securities class actions under
46
Rule 10b-5 is the modified out-of-pocket measure. In essence, this
awards to each person who traded during the class period the difference between the transaction price and the hypothetical fair value of
the security at the time of the transaction. This measure is meant to
be purely compensatory—punitive damages have no place under the
47
Securities Exchange Act. When there are multiple defendants, the
starting point for calculating damages is that each defendant found
guilty of fraud is jointly and severally liable for all the losses her decep48
tion proximately caused. We should note, however, that one of the
plaintiffs’ bar’s aims in pursuing scheme liability was to hold each participant in the scheme responsible for all investor damages flowing
from the overall fraud, whether or not directly connected to the par49
If Stoneridge had applied such an apticipant’s own deceptions.
proach, Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta would have been liable for
damages far beyond the effects of their own transactions, which were
only a piece of Charter’s fraud.
45

See James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996) (examining the current “scope of liability for collateral participants” under section 10(b)).
46
See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 717 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that, although courts
are amenable to using any appropriate measure of damages, the common standard in
Rule 10b-5 cases is the tort-based out-of-pocket measure).
47
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) (limiting recovery to “actual damages”).
48
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f), which is
discussed infra in notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
49
See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644,
722-23 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (determining that a plaintiff can pursue a claim for joint and
several liability against defendants who are “primary violators in the scheme, as a
whole”). This is not a necessary conclusion, however, and a court could reasonably
hold that third-party defendants are responsible only for damages flowing directly
from their own deceptions (e.g., by reference to doctrines of loss causation).

2010]

Reading Stoneridge Carefully

2139

The aggregate of such per-trade recoveries can be staggeringly
large, usually far in excess of any benefit the defendants hoped to gain
from the misrepresentations or concealment. Multibillion-dollar cases
are not infrequent, and hundred-million-dollar cases are ordinary.
That is not, by itself, problematic if those recoveries closely approximate actual investor injuries. However, my sense is that they do not,
and that the prevailing approach overcompensates fairly significantly,
albeit for understandable reasons.
The first reason is doctrinal and connects Stoneridge back to Basic
50
Inc. v. Levinson, the Court’s seminal decision on reliance in openmarket fraud litigation. Basic insists that reliance is a crucial element
of the plaintiff’s cause of action, but it creates a presumption of reliance in most cases involving widely traded securities, thereby facili51
tating class certification. While Basic describes this as a rebuttable
presumption, it is well recognized that defendants have no practical
ability to rebut on an investor-by-investor basis—and make no effort to
do so—once the court has determined that the alleged fraud did, in
52
fact, distort the stock price. That brings us to what we mean by reliance, and here, Basic is confusing. If the presumption of reliance is
based on the assumption that investors relied by assuming that the
prevailing market price was accurate (and thus simply free rode on it),
large numbers of investors with actively managed portfolios would not
qualify and do not deserve compensation. The failure to exclude
these from the recovery class implies substantial overcompensation.

50

485 U.S. 224 (1988).
For elaboration on the points made here, see Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at
Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 158-62 [hereinafter Langevoort, Basic at Twenty], which justifies Basic’s presumption of reliance as an assertion
by the Court that investors have a right to rely on stock-price integrity. See also Donald
C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 892-93 (1992) [hereinafter Langevoort, Theories] (describing
the “practical consequences and . . . conceptual underpinnings of the fraud-on-themarket theory” as applied in Basic).
52
Basic allows rebuttal if the defendants can show that the decision to buy or sell
was disconnected from the allegedly fraudulent market price. See 485 U.S. at 248-49
(“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the
price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price,
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”). For example, indexed mutual
funds and pension funds commonly participate in recoveries even though they purchase and sell automatically, without regard to price, following an algorithm designed
simply to keep the portfolio in balance with the index. Nevertheless, it is easy for investors to claim that they relied in some way or another, and an evidentiary hearing for
thousands of investors would be extraordinarily costly and probably fruitless.
51
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If the presumption is instead based on the assumption that investors simply considered the prevailing market price to be honest (i.e.,
not the product of fraud), the problem of overbreadth within the class
diminishes. But this comes only by abandoning reliance as a meaningful element. Fraud distorts prices with some frequency, and no
reasonable investor would ever assume otherwise by relying blindly on
price integrity. Efficient markets price the risk of asymmetric information; they do not assume its absence. To the extent that we con53
tinue to insist on reliance—an insistence that Stoneridge repeats —
overcompensation comes from allowing recovery as a result of the
practical impediments that effectively make the presumption conclusive by those who simply would not be able to demonstrate justifiable
reliance on the fraud if put to the task.
There is a way out, which Justice Brennan unsuccessfully tried to
urge on Justice Blackmun in private correspondence while the latter
54
was writing the Basic opinion: abandon the insistence on reliance altogether (i.e., make the presumption conclusive) and substitute a causation inquiry to find injury, asking simply whether the investor purchased or sold at a distorted price. This would effectively create an
entitlement to reliance on price integrity, conferred as a matter of ju55
ristic grace. This is not an unreasonable position as a policy matter,
and it is probably the only plausible explanation for how current law
actually operates, notwithstanding the Court’s repeated insistence
otherwise. But note that this move jettisons reliance as it is conventionally understood in the law of fraud, which means that we can no
longer say that the damages imposed in fraud-on-the-market cases
56
simply compensate for detrimental reliance. For many class mem53

See 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s
deceptive acts is an essential element of the [section] 10(b) private cause of action.”).
54
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 51, at 153 n.9 (describing attempts by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun to satisfy their concerns without losing others’ votes).
Justice Brennan ultimately gave up this effort after noting that their disagreement was
probably trivial precisely because defendants had no practical ability to rebut. See id. at
162 nn.45 & 47. Adam Pritchard uncovered this correspondence. See Pritchard, supra
note 5, at 221 n.16 (citing correspondence between the Justices).
55
See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 766-81 (2006) (arguing for the viability of the fraud-on-themarket presumption). Early law and economics commentary explicitly rejected a role for
reliance in fraud-on-the-market cases. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (1983)
(“The concept of a presumption of reliance . . . is best abandoned.”).
56
For a thoughtful discussion of what makes reliance an essential element in fraud
cases, see John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001 (2006). The authors discuss the fraud-on-the-
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bers, what is described as injury is merely the deprivation of a judicially created entitlement. Given the de facto substitution of causation
for reliance, it is perfectly fair for courts to ask whether liability is proportionate to the nature of the wrong.
A second reason to worry about disproportion has to do with proving injury. Arriving at the aggregate damage amount is an extremely
complicated econometric task, on which plaintiffs’ and defendants’
expert witnesses inevitably disagree. The potential for erroneous computation by a judge or jury is thus considerable, though it is not clear
that the mere potential for error necessarily threatens defendants
more than plaintiffs. But there is a steadily growing belief among financial economists that markets can both over- and underreact to
57
news (as well as respond to pseudonews), so that faith in the precision of the measurement process weakens. Congress was concerned
enough about this that it addressed the issue in the PSLRA in 1995,
58
but not in a very sophisticated way. To the extent that the econometric tools have less power than we would like in a noisy marketplace,
the risk of biased measurement of damages goes up. True, there can
be both under- and overreaction. But because plaintiffs choose which
lawsuits to bring based on the amount of damages that might be recoverable, the sample brought to court will naturally favor those where
there may have been an overreaction.
A third—and perhaps the most familiar—reason for concern, initially explored in depth by Frank Easterbook and Daniel Fischel, is that
market theory and argue that Basic preserves the special role for a reliance requirement because of the rebuttability of the presumption. Id. at 1018-19. I suggest that the
norm is instead de facto irrebuttability—and hence simple causation—which changes
the analysis substantially.
57
See, e.g., Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 533-35
(2003) (arguing that although analysts assume that “smart” investors know how to adjust incorrect pricing when they see it, there is no evidence to explain how investors
identify incorrect prices); Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market
Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 509 -10 (2006) (describing the phenomenon of market overreaction to non-news); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy
Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 139 -41 (2006) (analyzing the layered effects of
misinformation and heuristic errors on investor behavior); see also Langevoort, Theories,
supra note 51, at 872 (juxtaposing regulators’ view of the efficient market with that of
investors “overreacting to the most recent or most vivid news”).
58
See, e.g., Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879,
894-95 (1998) (describing PSLRA’s limit of damages in fraud-on-the-market cases as a
means of controlling descriptive efficiency); see also Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity
and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177, 1200
(1996) (“[The PSLRA’s damages cap] adds confusion when its drafters sought certainty. It adds complexity when they sought simplicity.”).
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fraud produces a mix of losses and gains for investors: for every unfor59
tunate buyer there is a lucky seller, and vice versa. So the net harm to
investors as a class approaches zero, with the difference being those
trades by insiders complicit in the fraud. This difference is usually just
a small portion of the aggregate trading. Although compensating for
losses while ignoring all gains might not seem particularly troubling in
any single case (except with respect to particular plaintiffs who traded
60
actively during the class period and gained more than they lost), over
time the combination of fortuitous trading gains and compensated
losses will put many investors in a better position than they would be in
a world with no fraud at all. This suggests systematic overcompensation for many institutional and other active plaintiff-investors—at least,
61
over a lifetime of trading. And institutional plaintiffs are the primary
62
beneficiaries of the contemporary class-action system.
59

See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 638-39 (1985) (pointing out that when public corporations issue new, falsely priced stock, prior investors sell at a profit while buyers ultimately
lose). An important addition to the net-market-effect literature is Paul G. Mahoney,
Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992).
Mahoney notes that Easterbrook and Fischel fail to address the issue of social cost: if
issuers are forced to pay damages that fall below their net gains, there will be deterrence from the fraudulent activity. Id. at 629-30.
60
For a discussion of cases dealing with this particular issue, see Samuel Francis,
Note, Meet Two-Face: The Dualistic Rule 10b-5 and the Quandary of Offsetting Losses by
Gains, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3045 (2009). Francis analyzes the various issues that have
arisen before courts when members of the class purchase and sell multiple times
throughout the relevant period, and when some class members benefit while others
lose. Id. at 3061-64.
61
See ANJAN THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY, THE ECONOMIC
REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS LITIGATION 14 (2005) (establishing that as
many as forty percent of large institutional investors included in the analysis were overcompensated in securities class actions). This overcompensation is the starting point
for analyzing a separate problem: the so-called “circularity” in fraud-on-the-market
cases. Circularity arises because either the issuer itself or its director-and-officer insurer fund most settlements and judgments, both of which operate as charges, not directly
to the corporate actors who engineered the fraud but rather to the issuer and (thus)
its shareholders. The result is that compensation has a pocket-shifting character—i.e.,
it operates as a form of investor insurance—with high transaction costs. There is controversy in the literature about whether this is truly problematic or not. See Alicia Davis
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 283 (2007) (proposing a
compensation fund that would achieve “the promise of superior deterrence because its
fraud risk-rating mechanism, unlike securities litigation, subjects all corporations to
sanction”); Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 WIS.
L. REV. 455, 457-58 (criticizing believers of the circularity hypothesis, who argue for
denying many investors recovery, as engaging in “academic activism” that contradicts
congressional intent); cf. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 335-36 (contending that compensation is not
problematic because it helps enforce mandatory disclosure obligations). By and large,
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A fourth and final reason for concern deserves more attention than
it has received. Recall that the computation of aggregate damages
proceeds by measuring the difference for each trade by reference to the
63
transaction price (which is known) and a hypothetical “fair” price.
The near universal assumption in the case law is that the fair price is the
price at which the securities would have traded had the truth about the
64
issuer been told. But for many reasons, some of which are discussed
65
more fully below, that may not be the right counterfactual. If the
more likely alternative to a defendant’s misrepresentation would have
been to say nothing at all, or to engage in lawful “puffery” rather than
66
tell the truth, then damages based on the standard assumption overcompensate. For instance, take a case in which, immediately after a misrepresentation, the price per share is $21 and the plaintiff buys at that
critics of the circularity argument quite correctly point out that many investors will be
net losers, even over a lifetime, and thus deserve compensation. But that criticism
would not counter the systemic overcompensation argument if the result of the system
is that money is paid without regard to whether a person is actually overcompensated—i.e., to undeserving as well as deserving class members.
62
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005) (“In 2004, securities fraud class action settlements produced $5.45 billion in cash to be distributed to
defrauded investors. Institutional investors own the lion’s share of the publicly traded
equity securities in this country and therefore were entitled to collect most of that
money . . . .”). The implication of the critique of compensation in securities class actions is not to abandon these actions but rather to focus more clearly on deterrence as
the proper way of structuring a remedy. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 642-43 (1996) (arguing that
the current pocket-shifting scheme of compensation should be replaced by an optimaldeterrence-oriented litigation framework); Rose, supra note 10, at 1352 (arguing for an
oversight approach to eliminate current problems with the compensatory scheme).
63
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64
See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
damages are usually based on what the stock would have been worth “had all the information been disclosed” (citation omitted)); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec.
Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (D.N.J. 2005) (observing that the “true value” of the
shares would be based on the value after the fraud has been disclosed to the public).
65
See Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and the Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. L. 183, 185 (2009) (“[W]e simply cannot say that the counterfactual to an alleged misrepresentation is necessarily the revelation of the truth. If
there was no duty to disclose and silence was a realistic option, then that actually may be
the more likely counterfactual ‘no fraud’ state of the world.”). For a discussion of the
counterfactual problem generally, see Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual
Keys to Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199.
66
See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 46, at 606-09 (critiquing the
proposition expressed in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997),
which stated that that vague but positive statements by an issuer are not material to
investor behavior).

2144

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 2125

price. Assume that, had the truth been told, the price would have been
$15, as it is later once the truth is revealed. That suggests a compensable loss of $6, which is what nearly all courts would award. But now fur67
ther assume that the defendant had no duty to speak at all, and could
have chosen to say nothing or to speak in optimistic terms too vague to
be actionable. Had the defendant taken this course, the price would
probably still have been at (or close to) $21 and the plaintiff would have
a right to little or no compensation. If the latter is the more likely
counterfactual—i.e., the plaintiff would have suffered almost exactly the
same investment loss in the absence of a violation as it did in the presence of the one that occurred—then awarding $6 per share is significant overcompensation. While choosing the more likely counterfactual
between truth telling and lawful concealment is often difficult, simply
presuming that the truth would always have been revealed—and mechanically calculating damages based on that presumption—introduces
another overcompensatory bias into the law.
The point of the foregoing analysis is not to criticize those courts
that have created a nearly irrebutable presumption of reliance, assumed
market efficiency, ignored fraud-based gains, or used truth telling as the
standard counterfactual. There are good pragmatic reasons for each of
those choices. The crucial point, instead, is that as a cumulative result of
these and other doctrinal moves, the fraud-on-the-market theory becomes an extraordinary remedy that does far more than just make fraud
victims whole. Once we see the remedy as extraordinary, there is ample
justification for the courts that created this remedy to worry about
whether particular defendants really deserve to face it.
B. Culpability and Securities Fraud
Securities fraud can be—and often is—venal and corrupt, even
sociopathic. In this Section, however, I want to show that there is also
a significant portion of securities fraud to which we might attach
much less (perhaps even no) blameworthiness. It is this portion that,
when measured against the extraordinary liability regime just discussed, amplifies the concern about disproportion.

67

The duty to speak is a fairly circumscribed category, at least beyond those disclosures mandated by the SEC. See id. at 685-96 (showing that mere possession of information does not create a duty to disclose, but prohibits the use of “half-truths”
when one affirmatively speaks, and noting that some courts uphold a duty to update,
while all courts uphold a duty to correct when misinformation is discovered).
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Soon after Rule 10b-5 doctrine abandoned the privity requirement
68
in the late 1960s, thereby creating risks of vast liability from false disclosure and publicity, courts seemed to realize that more restraint in
the Rule’s application was needed. One of the first moves in this direction—resolving a decade of confusion in the lower courts—was the Supreme Court’s holding that liability under Rule 10b-5 required a show69
ing of scienter, which means that only intentional or subjectively reckreckless conduct is proscribed. At first glance, this would seem to eliminate much of the reason for doubt. Because Rule 10b-5 reaches only
intentional fraud, rational actors have the ability to refrain from activity
70
that would cause harm. This brings us back to the point, noted earlier, that tort law tends to apply more restrictive rules of reliance and
71
causation for negligence, but not with respect to intentional harms.
In two respects, however, this confidence is misplaced. The first—
a lively subject in the scholarly literature in the early 1990s—is that
some forms of misrepresentation and omission involve mildly tragic
choices where the speaker realizes that telling the truth will severely
harm some legitimate interest (e.g., the company and its shareholders),
while lying will harm a certain class of traders. The common example is
72
the desire to protect a trade secret or a promising merger negotiation.
To be sure, a reasonable response is to choose the less harmful course
but be prepared to compensate the traders if lying is the utilitarian
choice. But this gives all the more reason to make sure that the compensatory amount is limited to what is absolutely necessary. As the pre73
vious Section shows, there are grounds for concern about that. For
instance, is it necessarily desirable to compensate a trader who would
not be able to show actual reliance on the fraud (but who gains the presumption of reliance after Basic) in the case of a misrepresentation or
omission that can be justified on utilitarian grounds?
68

See infra text accompanying notes 88-93.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (holding that
scienter is a required element of Rule 10b-5 because of the language of section 10(b)
and the legislative history behind the Rule’s adoption).
70
Easterbrook and Fischel discuss this point in their explanation of legal rules that
could achieve proper deterrence. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 59, at 621-23.
71
See supra text accompanying note 45.
72
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market,
77 VA. L. REV. 945, 949 (1991) (acknowledging that it is sometimes in the shareholders’ best interest for “managers to lie to the market”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1091 (1990) (arguing that “strategic misrepresentations” should be
permitted when made “in furtherance of [a] fiduciary duty to shareholders”).
73
See supra Section II.A (discussing proportionality problems in Rule 10b-5 liability).
69
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Intentionality is a much more significantly incomplete response
with regards to vicarious liability. Especially in the area of third-party
liability, almost all claims of responsibility are directed at entities, not
74
individuals: law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, and so on.
The doctrine of corporate scienter, although admittedly fuzzy around
the margins, attributes intent or recklessness fairly readily from agent to
75
principal. As a result, corporate entities, and therefore their shareholders, bear most of the securities-fraud liability, not the individual
agents who committed the wrongful acts. In some cases, there may not
be any specific agent who acted wrongfully but simply collective
“wrongdoing” based on the conduct and knowledge of multiple agents.
76
In such cases, blameworthiness is muted, and often nonexistent.
Of course, there may be an economics-based argument for vicarious liability to force the internalization of costs and induce optimal precautions, though as Paul Mahoney, Jennifer Arlen, and William Carney
showed in two seminal scholarly works appearing at roughly the same
77
time, this argument is complicated and far from compelling. This issue
does not need to be addressed, although the disappearance of blameworthiness from vicarious liability (except in situations where there is an
inexcusable monitoring failure at the entity level) should be noted.
Thus, the argument can be made, but it is not easy.
There may be other reasons to worry about disproportion—
78
particularly based on the risk of judging in hindsight —but further
74

See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the claims in Stoneridge).
See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent authority remain applicable to
suits for securities fraud.”); Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365
F.3d 353, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a corporation’s scienter can be inferred from the scienter of its agents).
76
But see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation
and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 294-95 (concluding
that shareholders, particularly long-term, nontrading investors, should take responsibility
to be better informed and more active in management oversight). For a discussion of
the connection between vicarious liability and scienter in organizational settings, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 126-30 (1997).
77
See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 693 (introducing the notion that
corporate-liability theories may be incomplete because some agency costs are conventionally ignored); Mahoney, supra note 59, at 624-25 (hypothesizing that abandoning
fraud-on-the-market theory in favor of requiring “individualized proof of reliance”
would produce optimal deterrence).
78
See Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (2004) (discussing hindsight bias in fraud litigation,
where past mistakes could later be misinterpreted as intentional fraud). This is espe75
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discussion would take us too far afield. If we were sure that the fraudon-the-market remedy is simply (and efficiently) compensatory, this
might not matter much; risk of error is endemic to all litigation.
However, if the previous Section is correct, greater caution in assigning liability is warranted.
C. Section 21D(f)
Thus far, we have largely ignored a crucially important aspect of
the problem. Disproportion was a driving force behind the PSLRA,
and that legislation is a comprehensive response to it, as well as other
fears of litigation abuse. Specifically, Congress added section 21D(f)
79
to direct courts to implement a proportionate liability regime. One
would think, then, that concerns about disproportionality should disappear as a result.
Unfortunately, 21D(f) is a mess of a statutory text. It directs the
factfinder to determine the percentage of liability that any given defendant deserves measured against the aggregate fault of all persons
80
claimed to have “caused or contributed to the loss” —whether these
persons are named as defendants or not, and perhaps without regard to
whether they could be held liable at all. Completely undefined is how
the factfinder should construct the denominator: precisely who might
have caused or contributed? However, the allocation process is not
81
plaintiff-friendly, so this interpretive problem is not part of my analysis.
What takes away much of the protection is the total exclusion
from proportionate liability for those who “knowingly” violated the
law, defined with respect to Rule 10b-5 as acting with actual knowledge of the falsity of a representation or omission when persons are

cially true with respect to materiality; because lawsuits are only brought after highmagnitude events (usually adverse ones), there is a risk of overestimating the probability of occurrence that is hard to eliminate.
79
For a discussion of the legislative history and many of the interpretive problems
of the PSLRA, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157 (1996). Section 21D(f) has received
little judicial attention, presumably because most viable cases are settled prior to a jury
decision on liability. But see In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 236
F.R.D. 313, 317 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting the court’s inability “to find any opinion by a
court that has actually tried a case utilizing the [section 21D liability] provisions,” and
setting out a plan for its application).
80
See PSLRA § 21D(f)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(3) (2006).
81
See Langevoort, supra note 79, at 1166-68 (explaining the ways in which courts
allocate damages among responsible parties).
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82

likely to reasonably rely on it. The apparent intent of the legislation
was to distinguish between knowledge and recklessness, with only the
latter form of scienter warranting protection.
83
As previously noted, this treatment leaves much conduct that we
would regard as relatively low- or no-culpability behavior unprotected,
especially with respect to vicarious liability. Though the question was
not posed in Stoneridge because the case was still at the pleadings stage,
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola might well not have been protected
because their agents allegedly knew that they were facilitating a fraud
and that knowledge could then be attributed to the entity defendants
84
under agency-law principles.
III. TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF DUTY “WITHIN” RELIANCE
85

As set forth earlier, the reading that I am giving Stoneridge is best
described in terms of duty: Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola did not
owe a duty of candor to marketplace buyers of Charter’s stock that is
enforceable under Rule 10b-5 because their involvement was too remote or attenuated from those purchases for there to be protectable
86
reliance. To be sure, this form of duty analysis is jarring. In contemporary Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, duty plays a relatively circumscribed role, limited primarily to addressing when someone commits
fraud through silence or inaction—i.e., the affirmative duty to disclose. Prevailing authority provides that persons automatically assume
82

PSLRA § 21D(f)(10)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(10)(A).
See supra Section II.A.
84
The sales and marketing personnel apparently made the mid-level decision to aid
Charter by engaging in the sham transactions: there was no solid evidence that senior
executive officers at either Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola had approved the scheme. See
Brian A. Ochs, Has the Securities and Exchange Commission Expanded Corporate Liability?, 38
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1549, 1557 (2006) (noting that the SEC did not allege that Scientific-Atlanta’s executives reviewed the transaction documents). Undoubtedly, the motivation was to keep in place a profitable commercial relationship (Charter could have
threatened the loss of business if one supplier failed to play along while the other did).
All this easily supports attribution of knowledge as a matter of law to the defendant
entities. The best evidence of this comes from the SEC’s enforcement action involving
Scientific-Atlanta, which focused not on its assistance of Charter but rather its similar
sham transactions with Adelphia Communications. The SEC brought (and settled) an
action against Scientific-Atlanta’s chief financial officer, but without claiming that he had
knowledge. See In re Haislip, Exchange Act Release No. 54,030, 88 SEC Docket 779, at
782 (June 22, 2006) (finding that Haislip was a “cause” of Adelphia’s violations); see
also Ochs, supra, at 1556-57 (discussing the SEC’s action against Scientific-Atlanta).
85
See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
86
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159
(2008) (holding that the indirect chain of reliance is “too remote for liability”).
83
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an enforceable duty to speak truthfully whenever they either choose
or are required by law to speak through a medium that is likely to in87
Under my reading, however, duty
fluence investment decisions.
takes on a completely different role. In this Part, I will explore in
some detail the doctrinal move that this interpretation implies.
A. The Road Not Taken: The “In Connection With” Requirement
Concern about disproportion in Rule 10b-5 class actions arose as
88
soon as courts abandoned privity as a requirement for liability. Until
then, private securities fraud litigation had arisen mainly in face-toface dealings, with fraud by a purchaser or seller of securities and with
the victims as the counterparties in the transaction. In SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit famously held that one need not
89
be either a purchaser or a seller to violate section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.
Rather, the statutory and rule requirement that the fraud be “in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security” was satisfied when
90
the victims were purchasers or sellers. The violator could be anyone
who made a material misrepresentation or omission in a manner “rea91
sonably calculated to influence the investing public,” regardless of
who, how, or why it was made. Immediately, investors started filing
class actions, claiming that the entire marketplace had been deceived
by some kind of false publicity, and these suits soon became known as
92
fraud-on-the-market cases.
Over time, the “in connection with” test has come to be inter93
preted fairly consistently as a proximate cause requirement; that is,
87

See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 505-06 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing “misrepresentations” that would serve to “deceive purchaser” of stock as satisfying the duty requirement, without any further proof of privity).
88
See David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 441 (1969) (positing that with
the elimination of privity, “the defendant’s liability may far exceed the profit he made”).
89
401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 862.
92
See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42, 250 (1988) (holding that
“[i]t is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by the fraudon-the-market theory”).
93
See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 46, at 661 (explaining that courts
typically focus on the “link between defendants’ fraud and purchases or sales of securities by the victims” in their “in connection with” analysis). It is interesting to note that
in Basic, the dissenters (who but for the happenstance of vacancies and recusals could
easily have been the majority) suggested that the right approach might be a rejection
of Texas Gulf Sulphur and a reinstatement of a privity requirement, thereby destroying
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the standard interpretation of “reasonably calculated” is in terms of
foreseeability, not the speaker’s motivation. So long as the speaker
understands there to be a reasonable likelihood that the lie will influence investors’ decisions (or, after Basic, distort the stock price), liability follows. As we have seen, this is how plaintiffs sensibly argued Stoneridge: the third-party defendants allegedly knew that the sham transactions and underlying documentation would mislead Charter’s
auditors, and in turn, be incorporated into false and misleading financial statements issued by Charter and certified by those accountants.
This, the plaintiffs said, amply satisfied the proximate cause/reasonably
foreseeable standard, and should therefore also satisfy the test for thirdparty primary liability. By rejecting this argument—albeit under the
guise of the reliance requirement—the Court was restricting the stan94
dard proximate cause analysis. By referring to reliance, however, the
Court explicitly left the “in connection with” law untouched, an outcome that the government (particularly the SEC) no doubt wanted.
We should pause to note that many of the advocates on the defendants’ side wanted the Court to do otherwise. One popular argument was to point to language in a number of the Court’s recent opinions suggesting that the “in connection with” language is satisfied
95
only when the fraud and the purchase or sale “coincide,” which, they
said, would not be the case when behind-the-scenes deception occurs
prior to the making of the public disclosure. However, the dicta in
question suggesting the need for strict coincidence came out of insid96
er-trading case law and was meant to justify an expansive interpretation of “in connection with” in the special situation where the fraud is
97
not a communicative act but rather a simple breach of fiduciary duty.
the viability of the fraud-on-the-market lawsuit. See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra
note 51, at 163 (noting that Justice White’s dissent “hint[ed] at a rejection of SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur”).
94
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67
(2008) (holding that investors could not have been “said to have relied upon” the
third parties’ actions).
95
E.g., Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9, Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148 (No. 06-0043) (arguing that “in connection
with” can only be satisfied when the defendant’s acts, not an abstract “scheme,” coincide with a purchase or sale).
96
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (describing the “classical” theory of insider trading in relation to Rule 10b-5 violations).
97
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, the Supreme Court referred
to the “coincide” locution in the context of a fraud-on-the-market claim. 547 U.S. 71,
85 (2006). However, a careful reading makes clear that the Court was simply explaining the breadth of the “in connection with” requirement in the many contexts in
which it has been applied—hardly suggesting anything in the way of a limitation. See
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Only the most formalistic and mindless reading would suggest that the
same idea has any usefulness in fraud-on-the-market cases.
On the other hand, the Court could well have substituted its remoteness/attenuation test in place of proximate cause had it wished
to speak more expansively; indeed, that approach would have made
more sense as a conceptual matter than using the test to address reliance. So we might wonder what the consequence would be of so
doing—besides simply making life harder for government enforcement. One pre-Stoneridge case, which otherwise is something of a doctrinal anomaly, offers an interesting clue. In Ontario Public Service Em98
ployees Union Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel Networks Corp., the Second
Circuit confronted a case in which a class of purchasers sued Nortel
for false financial reporting. Notably, the plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers of Nortel stock; rather, they had bought shares in JDS
Uniphase, relying on the falsely positive financial information about
Nortel as a signal of JDS Uniphase’s good prospects, because it was
99
Nortel’s largest supplier of fiber-optic components.
If this was treated as an “in connection with” case, the question
would have been whether it was foreseeable that lies about Nortel
could or would affect JDS Uniphase. The answer would almost certainly be “yes”—market efficiency works so that news affects not only the
issuer’s stock price but also the prices of affiliated companies. However, the court dismissed the complaint on the curious ground that purchasers of JDS Uniphase did not have “purchaser-seller” standing to
100
sue Nortel. The reasoning is cryptic—since the plaintiffs were clearly
purchasers—but the court seems to suggest that one must be a purchaser or seller of securities of the company releasing the information.
That result, however, makes little sense in terms of “in connection
with” precedent: there is nothing in Rule 10b-5 law limiting fraud liability to the issuer itself, and other Second Circuit cases plainly recog101
nize that there is no such limitation. But note how the result might
SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (surveying contemporary
“in connection with” approaches). In other insider trading cases, courts have not been
insistent on strict temporal coincidence. See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226,
230-31 (2d Cir. 2001) (insisting only on a reasonable nexus between the misappropriation and the trading).
98
369 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2004).
99
See id. at 29 (observing that ten to fifteen percent of JDS Uniphase’s revenues
came from Nortel).
100
Id. at 32.
101
E.g., In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008)
(finding no case that limits fraud liability to the issuer). In fact, the Second Circuit has
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more easily be explained using the “duty within reliance”-type analysis
found in Stoneridge. The court could have said that the link between
Nortel’s false financials and trading in JDS Uniphase was just too attenuated. Put another way, an issuer owes the duty of candor to its own
purchasers and sellers (or those of merger partners or takeover tar102
gets ) but not to the investing world at large.
B. Rediscovering Duty
Contemporary Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence uses duty mainly to determine when silence is fraudulent—i.e., the duty to speak. But earlier in its development, duty played a more pervasive role. This was especially true in the earliest days of private securities litigation, before
the courts had either imposed a scienter requirement or limited the
103
Particularly notable
scope of the affirmative disclosure obligation.
here was the so-called “flexible duty” approach, a holistic inquiry that
assessed liability based on (1) informational imbalance between the
parties; (2) relative access to information; (3) who initiated the transaction; (4) benefit to the defendant; and (5) defendant’s awareness of
104
As the law gradually became
the reliance on the misinformation.
more refined and restrictive on scienter and duty to disclose, the flexible duty approach was rendered problematic and gradually fell into
105
disuse—though echoes of it can still be found in modern case law.
As this doctrinal retrenchment occurred, the specific question of
third-party liability for fraud turned into the law of aiding and abet-

explicitly disclaimed any such reading of Nortel. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig.,
503 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In short, the district court incorrectly read Nortel Networks to mean that an action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements about a security
purchased by the plaintiff lies only against the issuer of the security . . . .”).
102
See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 177 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We emphasize . . . that it is no defense that the alleged misrepresentations were made in the
context of a tender offer and proposed merger . . . .”).
103
See generally Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation’s Affirmative Duty to
Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979) (recognizing the broad scope of the duty to disclose
applicable at the time).
104
See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that Rule
10b-5 “must be construed liberally and flexibly” to meet Congress’s intentions); see also
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979) (referring to White v. Abrams’s
“flexible duty standard” and summarizing relevant analysis factors from that opinion).
105
See Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1330 n.26 (8th Cir. 1991) (limiting rejection of the “flexible duty” test to the scienter element of Rule 10b-5); see
also Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule
10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1671-74 (2004) (discussing the confusion surrounding
the “flexible duty” approach).
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106

ting, where it thrived until Central Bank. At first glance, aiding-andabetting law was straightforward, asking simply whether the third-party
defendant (1) substantially assisted the primary defendant in violating
the law and (2) acted with the requisite scienter. However, a closer
look shows that duty played a substantial and explicit role in this in107
quiry. Courts regularly encountered situations in which the alleged
assistance was fairly small, sometimes even nonexistent (i.e., a failure
simply to blow the whistle on wrongdoing by the primary violator).
The resulting doctrine was messy but generally took the position that
if there was a duty (flexibly determined) running from the third party
to the victims, then the intent standard would be applied broadly—
including recklessness—and the required assistance would not have to
be all that great. In the absence of duty, by contrast, the test would be
more demanding, requiring actual knowledge and greater involve108
ment. Some courts even said that when there was no duty, secondary actors could not be held liable absent a showing of “high conscious intent,” meaning not only actual knowledge, but a specific
109
desire to have the fraud succeed.
What was happening here, obviously, was an effort to restrict aiding-and-abetting liability to situations where, in the courts’ view, the
behavior warranted fraud-on-the-market liability—precisely what also
motivated Stoneridge under my reading. In other words, if a duty-based
approach to third-party primary liability were to emerge, it would reconnect contemporary doctrine to a body of law that asked similar
questions in a broader context twenty years ago. But for its truncation
as a result of Central Bank, that body of law might well have evolved to
make duty analysis central to Rule 10b-5 more generally.

106

See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994) (concluding that section 10(b) does not reach aiding and abetting).
107
See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and
the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 318-19 (1988) (describing secondary liability in
terms of duty).
108
See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the scienter requirement “scales upward when [the] activity is more remote” (quoting Woodward
v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975)); Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96
(“This issue [of the extent of involvement required] turns on the nature of the duty
owed by the alleged aider and abettor to the other parties to the transaction.”).
109
See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that the scienter requirement would be met if the “abettor acts from a desire to
help the fraud succeed”); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,
496-97 (7th Cir. 1986) (insisting on a showing that defendant had “thrown in his lot”
with the primary wrongdoer).
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C. Defining Duty for Purposes of Third-Party Liability
A reinvigorated approach to duty within reliance essentially says
that a person does not bear liability to one or more victims in a Rule
10b-5 lawsuit unless that person owes a duty of honesty or candor to
those victims. How, then, might that duty arise? A threshold question
here is whether fraud-on-the-market cases differ from ones arising in
face-to-face settings. Because the approaches to reliance—as well as
the liability risks—differ so considerably depending on whether we are
talking about fraud that distorts market price (fraud-on-the-market)
or fraud that affects a particular investment transaction, the answer
would seem to be “yes.” A stricter conception of duty makes sense in
the open-market setting for the reasons set forth in Part II, and what
follows is meant to address only that context.
Two methods flow in a fairly straightforward manner from the existing case law on duty. One is for the third party to identify itself, or allow
itself to be identified, in such a way that would lead a reasonable investor
to believe that it was assuming responsibility for the accuracy of the public communication by the primary violator. Words and phrases like “en110
dorsing” or “vouching for” capture this idea.
A second method is via a fiduciary relationship, or something sufficiently akin thereto. Corporate officers, directors, and other agents
involved in the disclosure process are fiduciaries vis-à-vis the issuer and
its shareholders, and this relationship has long been recognized to include a duty of candor. This should suffice to create the requisite duty
regardless of attribution, and it also becomes a reasonable (if somewhat awkward) basis for extending the fiduciary duty to the issuer as
111
well. This duty, of course, is owed only to the insiders’ own investors.
Beyond these, I would suggest three other circumstances that also
work to create a relational duty. The first is professional status or ex110

This is the plaintiff’s use of attribution as a sword, as opposed to defendant’s use
of nonattribution as a shield, as occurs in so many of the cases. See supra note 22 (describing cases in which plaintiffs were required to show attribution to state their claim).
111
See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 105, at 1654-57 (discussing fiduciary duty in
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, particularly in its relation to state common law concepts);
Jennifer O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary
Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 475, 496 (2002) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court has also shown a marked respect for the federal securities laws in cases involving the breach of the fiduciary duty
of disclosure.”). This is not to suggest that executives’ duty to speak is necessarily so expansive; again, that is a different question. See United States v. Schiff, Nos. 08-1903, 081909, 2010 WL 1338141, at *8-9 (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (rejecting the fiduciary-based
responsibility of an executive to correct misstatements made by another executive).
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pertise in the world of finance that makes it reasonable to expect that
the person or entity appreciates both the regulatory constraints and
the economic harm that flows from misinformation spread into the investment marketplace. This is one (and perhaps the only) way of making sense of Stoneridge’s distinction between the worlds of commerce
and finance: more can reasonably be expected of those in the latter
category. There is room here to take account of the unambiguous obligations to the public that licensed securities professionals (brokerdealers, investment advisers, etc.) have under the prevailing regulatory
regime. Conversely, we might also consider whether the nature of the
third party’s professional obligations cut against a broad imposition of
duty. Lawyers’ duties are problematic, as many courts have recognized,
because of the special obligations of zealous advocacy and confidential112
ity that apply as a matter of professional obligation.
The next duty circumstance is creative involvement in the ultimate public deception—participation that is not simply substantial
but actually helps to engineer or design that deception, thereby making it more likely to succeed. Schemes to defraud require planning
and cleverness to avoid detection and have their desired effect. Offering the brain power for a plan or arrangement merits the imposition
113
of a duty.
This concept ties to the idea in Stoneridge that the two
third-party defendants were largely supernumeraries to Charter’s role
as producer, director, and writer of the fraud, which points away from
duty. Where the third party itself produces, writes, or directs the
scheme, the result should be different.
Finally, borrowing from the aiding-and-abetting cases, a sufficiently high form of purpose or desire to deceive investors in the general
marketplace—“throwing one’s lot in” with the scheme or arrangement—should probably satisfy the duty requirement, though I am not
sure that it adds much to the other factors. Here again, the presence
of such specific intent to deceive the investing public removes some of
the concern about disproportionality.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that someone violates Rule 10b-5
with respect to another’s principal violation simply because a duty at112

See Abell, 858 F.2d at 1133 (stressing the importance of attorney-client privilege
in the justice system). Given the complexity of the issue and the fact that it has been
debated so extensively elsewhere, I will not delve more deeply into the question of lawyer’s liability here. As a general matter, my inclination would be to hold lawyers liable
as “immediate” primary participants in fraud-on-the-market cases only when they assume creative control of the fraud or vouch for the accuracy of their clients’ disclosures.
113
See infra Section IV.C (explaining liability premised on participation in a greater “scheme” to defraud).
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taches. All I am doing here is assessing whether the third party’s conduct is too attenuated or remote from the deception for there to be
reliance on the part of the investing public, on the assumption that
too much attenuation or remoteness makes it unfair to hold the third
party liable for extraordinary fraud-on-the-market damages. Without
suggesting that these five possibilities are necessarily the only ways of
imposing a duty, they do seem particularly well suited to Stoneridge’s
framing of the issue. In the next Part, we will see how these principles
might be applied in specific cases.
IV. APPLYING DUTY
As Stoneridge rightly suggests, third-party liability involves a continuum of causation, which can roughly be divided into three segments. The first is when the third party assists but does not otherwise
engage in a deceptive act. Since Central Bank, this does not suffice for
114
liability in a private lawsuit. The second is when the third party engages in a deceptive act, but is a step or two removed from the disclosure that is disseminated publicly. This is the Stoneridge problem, and
there, the Court says that if the deceptive act is too attenuated from
115
The
the disclosure, there is no reliance on which to base liability.
final segment of causation is when the third party is integrally involved
in the preparation of the public disclosure.
One would think that the third category should be easy under
Stoneridge, and I think it is. The Court spoke of “immediate” involve116
ment in the disclosure as the opposite of attenuation, and—so far as
reliance is concerned—the question should simply be whether the involvement in the disclosure itself was indeed deep enough. Because
reliance was the principal ground on which the Court disposed of the
claims against Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, however, we have to
ask whether there might be other grounds on which third parties can
escape liability even when their involvement is immediate and they
acted with scienter. Textually, the two remaining questions would be
whether their conduct was itself deceptive, and if so, whether the deception was “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security.

114

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162
(2008) (“[Section] 10(b) . . . does not reach all commercial transactions that are fraudulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.”).
116
See id. at 160 (explaining that the inquiry is whether the act is “immediate or
remote to the injury”).
115
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On the first of these questions—deception—plaintiffs run into the
line of authority discussed earlier: in the eyes of at least some courts,
there is no liability unless the public lie can somehow reasonably be
117
attributed to the third-party defendant. Our first question, then, is
whether Stoneridge has anything at all to say about this. I think it does,
albeit indirectly. Then the question becomes how the duty-based
analysis helps as the circumstances begin to move further away from
direct involvement in the fraudulent disclosure.
A. Attribution
Prior to Stoneridge, courts asked whether, in these situations, it was
fair to say that the behind-the-scenes actor “made” a misrepresenta118
tion or “engaged” in a fraud, and so on. On this issue, many courts
adopted the bright-line attribution standard, especially in Rule 10b5(b) cases, under which third-party liability simply would not follow
unless the third party was publicly identified as responsible for the
119
fraudulent disclosure. The Second Circuit was particularly demand120
ing.
Elsewhere, some courts softened this requirement by suggesting that attribution can be implicit, such as when investors are aware
of the third party’s presence and could reasonably assume that the
121
Others—
third party was involved in the particular disclosure.
122
sometimes at the urging of the SEC in its amicus program —have re123
jected the need for attribution altogether and employed other tests.
The most important lingering question is whether the attribution
test survives Stoneridge. Formally it does, because the standard was typically articulated as a question of conduct (i.e., what does it mean to
“make” or “engage”), not one of reliance per se. The Solicitor General’s amicus brief specifically urged the Court not to rule on the attri-

117

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 2001) (declining to find primary liability under Section 10(b) when the “[p]laintiffs admit that no
misrepresentations attributable to [the defendant] were ever made to [the p]laintiffs”).
119
See supra text accompanying note 22.
120
E.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring
attribution before a secondary actor can be primarily liable for misstatements).
121
See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2009) (permitting
attribution when a court could “plausibly infer” that investors would have known about
the secondary defendant’s involvement).
122
See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
123
See e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006)
(expanding the scope of liability to deceptive conduct in a fraud “scheme”).
118
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124

bution question for precisely this reason. Unfortunately, some lower courts have taken this as a reason to treat Stoneridge as having little
or no relevance to defining deceptive conduct; as a result, they simply
apply pre-Stoneridge law—most importantly, the bright-line attribution
standard—to that question. When they do refer to Stoneridge, it is
without paying serious attention to what remoteness means.
It is hard to find a useful place for attribution after Stoneridge.
That test emerged shortly after Central Bank and was justified as necessary to give meaning to the insistence on reliance in that decision. In
Stoneridge, however, the Court amply took care of that problem by
promoting reliance as an independent inquiry in third-party liability
125
cases.
As a result, it is no longer necessary to alter the natural and
normal meanings of “make” and “employ”—the only important words
at issue—to address reliance.
Also instructive is the Court’s brief discussion of whether there had
to be a specific oral or written statement by the third party (or silence
126
when there is a duty to disclose), to which the Court answers “no.”
This responded to the Eighth Circuit’s determination that mere conduct—like overpaying for set-top boxes or entering into useless adver127
tising arrangements—cannot be a fraudulent act. In arguing this issue in the government’s amicus brief, the Solicitor General strongly
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit and asserted that the two defendants
had employed a deceptive device or contrivance within the meaning of
128
section 10(b). The Court does not go that far, at least explicitly, but
it does agree that mere conduct can be fraudulent and that the lower
129
court was therefore wrong on this aspect of its ruling.
This agreement is more significant than it seems. If ScientificAtlanta and Motorola did in fact employ a deceptive device or contrivance, then the statutory standard for Rule 10b-5 liability is satisfied so
124

See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 22 n.12 (arguing that attribution did not need to be addressed in Stoneridge since no public statements had been
made to investors).
125
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159
(2008) (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an essential
element of the [section] 10(b) private cause of action.”).
126
See id. at 158 (stating that it “would be erroneous” to conclude that an oral or
written statement is required for liability).
127
See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006)
(requiring that a defendant “make . . . a fraudulent misstatement or omission” to be
liable), aff’d sub nom., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148.
128
See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing the defendants’ alleged conduct was a deceptive device since it allegedly misled Charter’s accountant).
129
See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158 (observing that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive”).
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long as the deception was in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security and made with scienter. “In connection with” has nothing to
do with attribution, nor does state of mind. So, if one follows this logic, then there is simply no place left where attribution might be relevant, except as to reliance. And the Stoneridge Court showed no interest in making it important there, either. Put another way, in the face
of a strict attribution rule, Stoneridge’s principle largely becomes useless, because lack of attribution disposes of most cases without triggering any inquiry into remoteness. The only class of cases in which the
principle would be relevant are those in which there is attribution,
and it is hard to imagine many cases involving attribution that would
raise significant remoteness issues. To me, it is far more plausible that
the Court wants its principle—not something so different and inconsistent—used to resolve these kinds of questions.
To illustrate why an attribution rule makes no sense, consider a
case (similar to many cases that have been litigated) in which a company executive deliberately misleads a securities analyst, who then issues an excessively optimistic buy recommendation without quoting or
referring to the executive. The courts’ standard and sensible response
130
has been that the executive and, derivatively, the issuer are liable. But
this would not follow if we applied a strict attribution test. The better
approach—Stoneridge’s roadmap—is to ask whether the executive employed a deceptive device or contrivance and, if so, whether it was nonetheless too remote or attenuated from the recommendation on which
investors relied. Surely if the answer is yes to the first question, and no
to the second question, such a result fully justifies the courts’ rulings in
this area. If the absence of attribution is not a problem here, why
should it be a problem anywhere else? In sum, attribution adds nothing
of use to the law now that Stoneridge has addressed reliance by reference
to remoteness and attenuation.
That said, many lower courts have disagreed and assumed that
Stoneridge gives them no reason to depart from their prior holdings.
130

See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (declaring that a
corporation “cannot escape liability simply because it carried out its alleged fraud
through the public statements of third parties” (quoting Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74
F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996))); Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F.
Supp. 2d 59, 74-76 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining different courts’ perspectives on liability
predicated on misleading analysts). On the status of this idea in the Second Circuit,
see In re Van der Moolen Holding N.V. Securities Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), in which the court held that misrepresentations in a company’s operations reports could be ascribed to a specific source, even when not explicitly attributed,
because the information could only have been obtained from that source.
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Why? There is of course the natural psychological tendency—to which
judges are as susceptible as anyone—to interpret new information in a
way that justifies and maintains consistency with prior perceptions and
actions. I suspect Justice Kennedy likely aided this interpretation with
131
his writing style and the harsh dicta he included in the opinion. He
made it very easy for readers to think the decision was simply about restricting third-party liability, which may have blinded them to the more
moderate and flexible principle on which the decision turns.
A Ninth Circuit case, In re Peregrine Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation,
nicely illustrates how difficult it is to stay the course, and deserves its
132
status as an opinion “not for publication.”
The Circuit reads Stoneridge as requiring public knowledge of the improper behind-the-scenes
transaction, not just the fact that the third party and the main wrongdoer were doing business: “[U]nder Stoneridge, which concerned similar allegations, these transactions cannot form the basis of [section]
10(b) liability unless a ‘member of the investing public had knowledge . . . of [the business partner’s] deceptive acts’ sufficient to dem133
onstrate ‘reliance upon any of [the business partner’s] actions.’”
In fact, the quoted sentences in Stoneridge read like this, putting in
italics all that the Ninth Circuit left out: “No member of the investing
public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts during the relevant times. Petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that
134
we find too remote for liability.”
The Second Circuit’s strong reaffirmation of a strict attribution
135
standard in Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP
at least quotes accurately from Stoneridge, but it is no more openminded in its reasoning. The court takes note of the remoteness language, but simply decides that anything unattributed is thereby remote—hardly a self-evident proposition. It also confronts the argument that the outside counsel’s alleged deception to the company was
in the world of investment, not the world of commerce, but finds this
point to be of little significance. Beyond that, the opinion is largely a
repetition of the policy-based arguments underlying its initial adoption

131
132
133
134
135

See, e.g., supra note 4.
310 F. App’x 149 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 151 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159).
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
No. 09-1619, 2010 WL 1659230 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2010).
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136

of the bright-line test.
The Second Circuit never acknowledges the
possibility that the Supreme Court’s failure to embrace an attribution
requirement, which would have been an easy way of disposing of the
plaintiffs’ case against Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, might suggest
that the Court favored the different and more nuanced way of addressing reliance set forth in the opinion.
B. Involvement in the Disclosure Itself
If the attribution problem is surmounted, it becomes fairly easy—
and justifiable—to hold actors liable when they participate “immediately” in the preparation of the fraudulent disclosure, assuming
scienter. Many of the factors set forth above work to justify the imposition of a duty. For example, many of the cases arising in this area involve executives below the CEO or CFO level, who are nevertheless responsible for the document’s design and drafting. Company managers
involved in the disclosure process are fiduciaries, with a distinct duty of
candor, and are on notice that they are working in the world of
finance, not in ancillary business activity.
One case in this spirit—part of the small handful in which Stoneridge has been read to support plaintiffs’ claims—is New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. Berry, which involved claims against the former general counsel at Juniper Networks, Inc., alleging that she
falsified corporate documents as part of an options-backdating
137
The court determined that she would be primarily liable
scheme.
for the falsifications, even with respect to those SEC filings that she
138
prepared but did not sign. The court considered her the main cause
of the falsifications, given her level of responsibility at Juniper for both
136

The court does not follow Justice Kennedy’s lead in dicta, arguing that the
bright-line approach is good policy because it protects third parties, like lawyers and
bankers, from unnecessary litigation and because it is easy to apply. Instead, it states
that a strict test “avoids protracted litigation and discovery aimed at learning the identity
of each person or entity that had some connection, however tenuous, to the creation of
an allegedly false statement.” Id. at *10. This is familiar rhetoric, but it ignores the
PSLRA’s imposition of heightened pleading requirements, which require specific facts
in the complaint that give rise to a strong inference of the defendant’s scienter before
even getting to discovery. See infra note 171. Nor does the court consider seriously the
policy implications of a rule that invites secondary actors to instigate fraudulent conduct
but then avoid liability to investors just by hiding from public view. In sum, the policybased reasoning is unlikely to be persuasive to anyone not already convinced of the disutility of private securities class actions as a compensatory or deterrence mechanism.
137
616 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
138
See id. at 995-96 (holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Berry’s substantial participation in the false statements).
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compensation and financial reporting; her conduct thus made the fal139
sity both necessary and inevitable. This, in turn, supplied the necessary proximity and immediacy to distinguish Stoneridge factually.
In Berry, the general counsel was truly integral to the fraudulent
140
disclosure.
Cases become more difficult when the involvement in
the disclosure is slightly less central. Merely being proximate to the
fraud is probably not enough to create primary liability, even for fiduciaries. Active engagement in the deception is necessary. What seems
most relevant is participation in the creative aspect of drafting the disclosure—involvement of the sort that makes the deception more likely
to work. This could sometimes happen through editing or commenting, though the most common kind of third-party review probably
rarely rises to this level. I have for some time believed that “co-authorship”—one of the other duty examples—captures this idea of creative
141
involvement fairly well.
A number of cases have arisen based on claims that a company
executive was responsible for alleged fraud by supplying misinformation to the disclosure team. Take, for example, a situation in which a
vice president of marketing (or another key sales executive) arranges
deals with customers that facilitate inappropriate revenue recognition.
The arrangements are misrepresented in the preparation of the accounts and hence fool the company’s auditors (and perhaps others)
involved in the reporting and disclosure process. A duty-based analysis says that liability is appropriate, especially if the fraud was specifically designed to fool others inside the company (thereby making it
more “inevitable” that it would succeed). Especially in the postSarbanes-Oxley reporting environment, internal corporate procedures for financial reporting extend widely into the company, so that
all key employees should understand that they are an integral part of

139

See id. at 996 (explaining that Berry’s oversight responsibilities of the option
grant process created primary “scheme” liability).
140
Id. at 990 (describing how general counsel helped to falsify financial statements).
141
I suggested this standard shortly after Central Bank. See Langevoort, supra note
19, at 892 (proposing that “involvement” be based on a broad conception of coauthorship). The SEC has continued to recommend a test that is very similar: the test
asks whether the defendant can fairly be said to have “created” the fraud—at least in
Rule 10b-5(b) cases. See Brief for Securities Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, In
Support of the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants on the Issue Addressed and in Support
of Neither Affirmance nor Reversal at 7, In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-1619); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 772 n.149 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (discussing the SEC’s recommendation in In re Refco).
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the disclosure process.
Surely a distortion of material information
by a high-level executive is enough so that the person can fairly be
said to have engaged in a fraud, not just assisted with one. At least
one post-Stoneridge case, however, has disagreed—though largely on
143
the assumption that the attribution test still prevails.
C. Scheme Cases
Stoneridge was decided in the shadow of the much larger Enron litigation, which raised many of the same issues. Because Enron was insolvent, the focus of litigation was against a set of investment banking
firms and law firms that allegedly assisted Enron in structuring scores
of transactions that operated deceptively and thus enabled Enron to
report its financial condition fraudulently. Perhaps the most famous
of these transactions was the “Nigerian Barges Transaction” structured
by Merrill Lynch, which disguised what was effectively a loan as a pur144
Some of the banks settled with the plaintiffs for
chase and sale.
more than $7 billion after the trial court ruled that their actions could
145
constitute a primary violation of the law.
In Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc., the Fifth Circuit reversed, freeing the nonsettling defendants from liability exposure in the Rule 10b-5 portion of the law146
suit. Like Stoneridge, this opinion can be read in a number of different ways. Its emphasis on duty is most striking. Language early in the
substantive portion of the opinion suggests that liability under Rule
147
10b-5 can never arise unless the defendant had a duty to disclose.
However, it is not clear that the court really meant to say, for instance,
that Merrill Lynch itself would have escaped liability had it publicly
142

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2009) (requiring an issuer to implement and evaluate a system of internal financial reporting controls).
143
See SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 357-58 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding allegations of a “chain of causation” insufficient to hold defendants primarily liable); cf. SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1257-62 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining “to impose
an attribution element in an SEC enforcement action”).
144
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing the sham transactions used to inflate reported revenues).
145
See id. at 379 (explaining the previous settlements would offset any potential
damages award in the present action).
146
See id. at 393-94 (holding that neither the class-reliance presumption nor the
fraud-on-the-market presumption served to establish defendants’ liability).
147
See id. at 384 (“For us to invoke the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance on an
omission, a plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the defendant owed him a duty of disclosure.” (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972))).
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misrepresented its dealings with Enron. Later on, the court turned
specifically to the meaning of “deception” in the context of an alleged
scheme to defraud and embraced the Eighth Circuit’s reading, which
insisted on either a third-party defendant’s actual misstatement or
148
failure to disclose when there was a duty to disclose —precisely the
approach that the Supreme Court later rejected as unduly restrictive.
The bottom line is stated clearly enough, however: “Enron had a duty
to its shareholders, but the banks did not . . . . The banks’ participation
in the transactions, regardless of the purpose or effect of those transac149
tions, did not give rise to primary liability under [section] 10(b).”
Immediately after Stoneridge, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
150
in the Enron case, which suggests that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling may
151
be consistent with the Court’s decision.
That, however, is unfortunate. At the very least, the Fifth Circuit was sympathetic to the Eighth
Circuit’s approach to what constitutes deception (i.e., the requirement that there must be either an affirmative misstatement or silence
in the face of a duty to disclose), which is why duty plays such an important role in the court’s analysis. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this approach, which renders the analysis suspect in its entirety.
If we shift to the Supreme Court’s inquiry into remoteness or attenuation, there are striking differences between the two cases. Most notably, the transactions in Enron were not normal commercial arrangements, but rather deals with investment bankers—registered broker152
Even
dealers—who were deeply involved in the world of finance.
putting aside the interesting question of how much of the creative design of these deals was the bankers’ work product, the nature of the
engagement was plainly a giant step closer to the issuer’s misrepresentation of its financial condition. In terms of the duty test suggested
earlier, the banks’ involvement was far from attenuated, having most
assuredly—if plaintiffs’ allegations about knowledge were right—
thrown in their lot with Enron’s insiders.
148

See id. at 388 (approving the Eighth Circuit’s definition of “deceptive” conduct
(internal citation omitted)).
149
Id. at 390.
150
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 552
U.S. 1170 (2008) (mem.), denying cert. to Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse
First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
151
See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 600, 640
(S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Because the majority’s particular holding . . . was not granted a writ
of certiorari and was not overturned nor even implicitly affected by Stoneridge, it is
binding on this Court.”).
152
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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The doctrinal difference, then, is that the Fifth Circuit was thinking of duty solely in its contemporary “duty to disclose” guise, and had
found the absence of such a duty to be dispositive of the broader
question of whether the banks had engaged in a deceptive act or prac153
tice. This analysis confuses two distinct duty questions. If banks are
assumed to have affirmatively engaged in a deceptive communicative
act through the way they structured the behind-the-scenes transactions—meaning that these deals were made with the purpose and intent of fooling Enron’s auditors and other gatekeepers—the remaining question becomes whether that behavior was too remote from
Enron’s financial reporting to fairly charge the banks with responsibility to injured investors. I doubt it.
A similar lack of insight post-Stoneridge can be found in a Seventh
154
Circuit case, Pugh v. Tribune Co. The allegation in Pugh was that the
publisher and certain other insiders of two Spanish-language newspapers engaged in a scheme to inflate the newspapers’ revenues by
lying to advertisers about their circulation through an audit interme155
diary, who was tasked with verifying the data in question.
A subsidiary of the Tribune Company, a public company, owned the
156
newspapers, and as a result of the scheme, Tribune’s financial re157
ports were materially misleading.
The Seventh Circuit invoked
Stoneridge to dismiss the action against the alleged mastermind, saying
that, even assuming the publisher foresaw and/or intended that the
scheme would result in Tribune making misleading financial statements, the “indirect chain to the contents of false public statements
158
[was] too remote to establish primary liability.”
Here again, some distinctions seem obvious. Most notably, the supposed mastermind was a senior official of a Tribune subsidiary. He owed
a fiduciary duty to the subsidiary, which presumably ran to Tribune and
its shareholders. Here, in other words, we have a fairly conventional duty
of candor that the court could have invoked had it wished. The fact that
this was a parent-subsidiary relationship, rather than a purely intracorporate one, should make no difference in applying this type of duty.

153

See supra text accompanying note 86 (comparing an affirmative duty to disclose
to duty arising out of reliance).
154
521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008).
155
See id. at 690 (explaining that falsely raising circulation figures permitted the
employees to charge advertisers higher rates that, in turn, increased revenues).
156
Id. at 690-92.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 697.
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D. Other Uses of Duty
The approach to duty I have developed here could work very effectively to inform the “in connection with” requirement. Instead of a
simple foreseeability analysis—which creates a very broad liability
threat—a court might say that, absent evidence of a specific intent,
such as desire or motivation to deceive investors, liability for fraud-onthe-market requires a duty to the marketplace. That would encompass
deception by issuers (and their officers and directors), underwriters,
accountants, investment bankers, brokers, and so forth, but not those
more remote from the resulting trading. This would actually explain
159
the Nortel case, discussed earlier, far better than its own reasoning.
160
Consider the following scenario from another case.
A wellknown mutual fund portfolio manager was interviewed in the financial press, and during the conversation, was asked about particular
stocks held by the fund; he said that he considered the technology
161
However, the manager was in
stocks to be very sound investments.
fact aware that the fund had begun dumping its technology stocks, but
since he had no obligation to disclose, he declined to do so in order
162
Assuming that
to prevent the stock market price from dropping.
this should be treated as a lie in the first place, is the manager—and
derivatively, the fund’s sponsor—liable for a potentially massive sum to
all investors who purchased the stocks between the time of the lie and
the revelation of the fund’s sales? One can see why this result might
seem excessive. Use of an invigorated duty analysis here could absolve
the defendants of liability because the manager’s fiduciary and statutory duties ran to the fund’s investors, not to those in the portfolio companies. Moreover, his statement did not seem to be part of a delibe163
rate attempt to manipulate the market for those stocks.

159

See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1997).
161
Id. at 541.
162
Id. at 541-42.
163
In SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 448-49 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc), the First Circuit overturned a panel decision, SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008), that
had adopted a broad, duty-based view that underwriters implicitly “make” a misstatement contained in a disclosure document prepared by a mutual fund adviser. The en
banc court said that even if underwriters owe special duties to investors to investigate
the securities they offer, that does not automatically turn into a distinct duty to speak.
Absent such a duty or some form of endorsement, they cannot be held liable for
statements made by another party. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 447-48.
160
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V. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
I have put forth a reading of Stoneridge at odds with the conventional
account. I do not expect that courts will promptly jettison their own
contrary readings and adopt my duty-based interpretation. Among other things, there is so much dicta in Justice Kennedy’s opinion—about
the scourge of strike suits, American capital-market competitiveness, and
the like—that courts committed to a more restrictive interpretation can
freely pick among the given reasons to stay the conservative course.
If this is true, then only legislation will change the direction of the
law, and I favor that. We are in the midst of an economic crisis that has
produced a high degree of sensitivity to greed and irresponsibility and a
recognition that the complexity of financial engineering can readily
conceal risk—systematic as well as firm- or industry-specific—and thereby promote excess. As a political matter today, if we were to ask
whether an otherwise complicit financial engineer should be spared
liability to investors simply because she is not identified as responsible
for the publicly-transmitted falsity, the popular answer would almost
surely be “no.” Unsurprisingly then, there have been legislative initia164
tives to rewrite the standard for secondary liability.
This brings us to the challenge of finding the right definition. If I
am correct that the unease that has produced much of the restrictiveness of third-party liability doctrine is a legitimate fear of disproportion, then any line that simply divides secondary actors into two
groups—those who face full fraud-on-the-market damages and those
who face no damages at all—will inevitably be unsatisfying.
The solution would be to address damages first, and then turn to
the scope of liability. This approach could be a systematic reform of
Rule 10b-5 damages to address the overcompensatory bias discussed
earlier—something I would favor in principle—but this would be a
daunting and politically sensitive undertaking, with issues going well
beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, for now, let us stay focused on
the third-party-liability problem.
There are two plausible approaches. One, recently recommended
165
by John Coffee, Jr., is to create liability “caps” for secondary actors.
164

See Malini Manickavasagam, Ceiling on Damages Urged for Bill to Restore Aiding and
Abetting Liability, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1725 (Sept. 21, 2009) (discussing the
testimony and hearings on S. 1551, the bill for the “Liability for Aiding and Abetting
Securities Violations Act”).
165
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Univ. Law
Sch., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary 10 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://
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For entities, Coffee recommends that a penalty not exceed the greater
of 10% of the defendant’s average income over its last three years, 10%
of the defendant’s net worth, or 10% of the defendant’s total market
166
For natural persons, Coffee suggests a penalty of $2
capitalization.
167
million but in no event more than $50 million. I am generally quite
168
sympathetic to redefining liability exposure in all Rule 10b-5 cases,
and I would not be opposed to this approach. But it does seem that
redefining liability for third-party actors is awkward if it is not part of a
more general effort to reform private securities litigation. Restricting
liability for secondary actors essentially leaves the bulk of the liability
on the issuer, and it is far from clear that this is always appropriate. It
also takes questions of the degree of involvement and culpability out of
the liability inquiry; the nonissuer mastermind of the fraud would have
the same limited liability as the less culpable participant.
An alternative is to revisit proportionate liability and revise section
21D(f) from scratch. The first question is who should face the full
force of those damages, overcompensatory fears notwithstanding. My
articulation would build on, rather than reject out of hand, the simplistic “actual knowledge” standard now in the law. I would say that
full-scale liability should attach if, but only if, the defendant acted with
actual knowledge of the fraud and bore primary responsibility for its
commission. Primary responsibility arises when the person was a moving force in the design and execution of the deception. The proposal
would permit more than one person to have primary responsibility.
For those who violate Rule 10b-5 but do not bear primary respon169
sibility, the factfinder (I would make it the judge ) should have reviewable discretion to limit damages to defendants’ fair share in light
of (1) the severity of the injury to investors and (2) the nature and
judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4052 (follow hyperlink under “Witness
Testimony”) (proposing a ceiling for the maximum penalty that may be imposed on
secondary participants so that punishments are “sufficiently painful to deter, but not so
large as to threaten insolvency”).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
See Langevoort, supra note 62, at 657-62 (considering which caps or alternative
measures would be appropriate to achieve deterrence in liability standards).
169
There is an important constitutional question about how much authority over
factual questions, in the name of litigation reform, Congress can take away from the
jury and assign to the judge in light of the Seventh Amendment. In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that the Seventh
Amendment does not restrict the ability of Congress to assign a strong gatekeeping
role to the trial judge. See 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (listing cases in which there
had been no Seventh Amendment violation).
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culpability of defendants’ involvement, as compared to the actions of
those with primary responsibility. This formulation is deliberately
open-ended but not particularly moreso than the current statutory language, and it avoids the silliness of having to apportion fair shares to responsible parties that sum to one hundred percent. The duty factors
170
set forth earlier would be a useful way of assessing relative culpability.
More than open-endedness, a concern with this approach is its
post hoc application. Most cases never get to trial, and the indeterminacy of fair share could cast a shadow of fear that would undercut the
purposes of proportionate liability. I am not sure how much of a
problem this is—settlement bargaining today already takes place in
the face of considerable factual and legal uncertainty, yet the results
171
nonetheless seem reasonably responsive to the underlying merits —
but if it is problematic, one solution would be to have the trial judge
make a preliminary assessment based on the particularized allegations
set forth in the pleadings at the same time that the judge rules on
whether there is a strong enough inference of liability in the first place.
This might seem frustrating to plaintiffs and their lawyers. But the
payoff is that it clears the way to expand the standard for secondary
liability with substantially lessened risk of disproportionality. Additionally, though there could be many ways to expand third-party liability, there are no good reasons why Congress should not simply restore
aiding-and-abetting liability once a fairer and more proportionate system for assessing damages is in place.
The defense-side objections to such a restoration are predictable, as
are the responses. The point to remember is that aiding and abetting is
already both a federal crime and a violation of the Securities Exchange
Act, with considerable liability consequences. Restoration only adds an
additional civil forum for redress, and stronger proportionate liability
reduces the risks considerably. To be sure, there is the concern that
low-merit litigation will systematically force unfair settlement payouts,
172
to which Justice Kennedy unfortunately once again gave voice. However, given the changes the PSLRA (which courts have construed fairly
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See supra Section III.C.
See, e.g., Marilyn Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 649 (2006) (concluding
from an empirical study of the impact of the PSLRA that there is “some evidence that
the merits do matter more, at least in the filing of complaints and the allegations included in those complaints”).
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See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163
(2008) (“[The] extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a
lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies.”).
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conservatively in the almost fifteen years since its enactment )
brought to the law, it is hard to believe that low- or no-merit lawsuits
systematically survive motions to dismiss so as to pose pervasive strike-suit
174
The shift toward institutional lead plaintiffs has also rethreats.
freshed the litigation environment by diminishing the autonomy of
175
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Perhaps additional reforms are warranted. But assuming that Congress is comfortable with whatever system is in place for
balancing the risks of excessive and inadequate liability, that same system should be used to address the secondary liability problem.
CONCLUSION
While I hope that lower courts will be more imaginative and careful in their interpretation of Stoneridge in future cases, early reader
reactions to any authoritative text are hard to dislodge, even if they
are careless. I am certainly postmodern enough not to suggest that
there is ever a single meaning or intention discoverable in any text,
including a Supreme Court opinion. Thus I will concede that the
reading I have given to Stoneridge here is just one of many possibilities,
and that it strikes me as far more plausible than the more familiar
ones in circulation likely reflects my own prior beliefs: I have long
been troubled by the disproportionality problem, and I am thus inclined to construe Justice Kennedy’s ambiguous text in that light.
Still, I am convinced that this is the most sensible reading.
My duty-based reading interprets the reliance requirement (i.e.,
176
“duty within reliance”), because that is all the Court addressed.
However, there is no need to confine it in this way. As we have seen,
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See cases cited supra notes 7-8.
There is evidence that the PSLRA has been imprecise in its impact, allowing
cases with merit to be thrown out and cases without merit to survive. See Stephen J.
Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1476-1507 (2004)
(surveying empirical evidence on the PSLRA’s effect on both frivolous and meritorious
suits); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 929-42 (detailing evidence showing that the passage of the PSLRA
failed to decrease nonmeritorious filings, despite the Act’s intentions).
175
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There are Plaintiffs and . . . There
are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV.
355, 356 (2008) (explaining that the lead-plaintiff provision, which replaced the “first to
file” rule, prevents plaintiffs’ attorneys from making “hair trigger” filings); Elliott J.
Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to
My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 551-53 (2008) (explaining that institutional lead plaintiffs have come to act as “reasonably diligent litigation monitors,” negotiating with plaintiffs’ attorneys at arm’s length and overseeing the settlement of their claims).
176
See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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there is no reason why the line between primary liability and aiding and
abetting should not be drawn by focusing on the remoteness or attenuation of the third party’s involvement in the same way. So, too, does
this apply with respect to standing to sue or even the jurisdictional “in
177
connection with” requirement. In fact, a close look at recent case law
shows a number of areas in which courts have used remoteness or attenuation to assess liability, suggesting that this really may be a unifying
178
idea in thinking about the scope of Rule 10b-5 more generally.
This reading has both the virtue and vice of moderation. Those
on the plaintiff/investor side of the long-standing debate over private
securities litigation policy will not like it because Stoneridge is a useful
symbol of judicial intolerance and derision, which they would like to
destroy through legislation. The defense/business side considers it a
holy victory to be interpreted expansively, according more to its rhetorical vigor than to its specific holding. So far, the latter construction
has the upper hand in the lower courts. I have attempted to move this
debate toward compromise. As noted, the strike-suit threat as a systematic concern is far overstated, at least since the PSLRA. So is fear of
private litigation as a threat to U.S. competitiveness. On the other
hand, the claimed damages at stake can be disproportionate both to
the aggregate of real investor-reliance injuries and to the severity of
the misconduct in question. This excess encourages too many marginal cases and distorts settlement negotiations. The judicious course
is to try to preserve appropriate private securities liability, for third
parties and otherwise, but also to pull back on the excess.
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See supra Section III.A (describing the “in connection with” requirement).
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2008)
(noting that, in assessing the extraterritorial scope of Rule 10b-5, the “absence of any
allegation that the alleged fraud affected American investors . . . or capital markets”
was a significant factor in the court’s ability to hear the claim), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
783 (2009) (mem.); see also Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing
Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071,
1092-96 (2010) (discussing the decision in Morrison and how to evaluate “conduct” in
the context of international investments).
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